As part of the recently enacted health-care reform legislation in the United States, the US Congress authorized an abbreviated regulatory pathway for the approval of biosimilars (also often described as follow-on biologics) 1 . Among other provisions, the legislation grants a new innovative biologic (termed pioneer biologic here) 12 years of data exclusivity, with the potential for an extension of 6 months if paediatric studies are conducted.
Data exclusivity is the length of time before a biosimilar can receive approval from the US Food and Drug Administration by relying at least in part on the safety and efficacy data for the pioneer biologic. Data exclusivity is one factor contributing to market exclusivity -the period of time during which a therapy is the only marketed version of that molecule -but not the only determinant. The results of patent litigation, the time spent in development and regulatory review, commercial decisions by competitors, and other factors all contribute to the market exclusivity period. The appropriate length of the data exclusivity period was widely debated before the abbreviated pathway for biosimilars was enacted; indeed, the US Congress considered bills with periods ranging from 5 years to 14 years. An earlier article intended to help inform this debate developed a financial model to evaluate how long a market exclusivity period would be required until a typical pioneer biologic earned a positive investment return 2 . In this model (see Supplementary information S1 (box) for details), a representative portfolio of pioneer biologics would be expected to 'break-even' (or to recover the average costs of development, manufacturing and promotion, and the cost of capital) in 12.9-16.2 years. Here, we present an analysis incorporating two refinements that have been made to this model that directly address important concerns that were raised during the debate leading up to the enactment of the recent US legislation.
Analysis
Some critics of a 12-year data exclusivity period, including the US Federal Trade Commission in a 2009 report 3 , have argued that 'early mover' competitive advantages should be sufficient to maintain innovation incentives, given relatively few expected biosimilar entrants and the likelihood that biosimilars will not be interchangeable with the pioneer biologic, which is the case with generic small-molecule drugs. To investigate this issue, the original model 2 has been modified to explicitly incorporate the impact of competition between the pioneer biologic and biosimilars after market exclusivity expires. We examined how substantial retention of sales for the pioneer biologic after biosimilar entry affects the break-even lifetimes for innovators. In addition, the extent to which patents provide protection against the early entry of competitors to a pioneer biologic was also debated. We have therefore conducted a simulation analysis examining interactions between data exclusivity and patent protection (each of which contribute to market exclusivity periods) in different scenarios to highlight the specific circumstances in which each of these modes of protection is important in maintaining innovation incentives.
An analysis of cumulative net present value for a representative pioneer biologic over its life cycle is presented in FIG. 1 . This analysis incorporates the research and development (R&D) and sales information of the representative portfolio of pioneer biologics examined in the previous article 2 . It also incorporates a cost of capital of 12% and a contribution margin on sales of 50%, consistent with the earlier study. However, unlike the previous model, the analysis also explicitly models the impact of biosimilar entry on the market share for the pioneer biologic, assuming that the market share for the biosimilar reaches 50% by year 4 following its entry and price discounts for the pioneer biologic reaching 15%, partially matching biosimilar discounts (Supplementary information S1 (box)). Examining how various market exclusivity periods affect break-even lifetimes, we found that the representative pioneer biologic fails to break-even under both 7-year and 10-year market exclusivity periods, even assuming it retains substantial market share after biosimilar entry. Break-even does occur with 12-year and 14-year market exclusivity periods, taking 17 years and 15 years, respectively. This compares to a break-even period of 14 years in the case of no biosimilar entry.
Although FIG. 1 underscores the impact of at least a 12-year market exclusivity period, it does not distinguish between the contributions of patent protection and data exclusivity in achieving this outcome. After market launch, data exclusivity and patent protection run concurrently. Data exclusivity provides additional market exclusivity protection only to the extent that patents can be circumvented by a biosimilar, or the remaining patent protection is shorter than the data exclusivity at the time of approval of the pioneer biologic.
To distinguish between the effects of these two modes of protection, we conducted a Monte Carlo simulation analysis, in which we defined market exclusivity as the longer of the data exclusivity and patent protection periods. In particular, we considered the effects of the different data exclusivity periods on break-even outcomes under alternative assumptions about patent protection. In scenario 1 (strong patent protection), biologic patents provided a lengthy expected period of protection against biosimilar entry (14 years on average). In scenario 2 (limited patent protection), we assumed only 7 years of expected patent protection, reflecting a lengthy R&D period or the possibility of successful patent challenges. Our analysis is based on the results of 1,000 Monte Carlo simulations for each scenario and specified data exclusivity period. The simulation draws values from normal distributions of the cost of capital and ▶ 12 years 10 years 14 years Nature Reviews | Drug Discovery average market exclusivity period by less than half a year, from 14.1 years to 14.5 years; and increases the likelihood that a typical biologic portfolio investment will break-even within 25 years from 70% to 75%.
The limited patent protection scenario presented in FIG. 2b assumes a mean of 7 years and a standard deviation of 2.5 years, with 95% of the draws having a patent protection period between 2 years and 12 years. In this scenario, patent protection alone (with no data exclusivity period) results in only a 14% likelihood of breaking even within 25 years of launch. A 7-year data exclusivity period is binding in almost 50% of the draws, but only increases the likelihood of breaking-even within 25 years from 14% to 17%. A 12-year data exclusivity period is almost always binding (in 97% of the draws); increases the average market exclusivity period from 7.1 years (with no data exclusivity period) to 12 years; and increases the likelihood of breaking-even within 25 years from 14% to 62%, suggesting greatly enhanced incentives for investment.
Policy implications
The results of this analysis are consistent with the US Congress's determination that a 12-year data exclusivity period for new biologics appropriately balances potential cost savings from price competition from biosimilars with long-term incentives for investment in innovative biologics. To the degree that biologic patents are relatively less certain and more vulnerable to challenge (our limited patent protection scenario), a data exclusivity period of 12 years greatly enhances investment incentives. Conversely, if biologic patents provide relatively strong protection with significant patent life remaining at approval, patents alone will be sufficient to maintain investment incentives in most cases. In those instances, the data exclusivity period has only a minimal effect on market exclusivity times and thus on health-care costs. The 12-year data exclusivity period therefore operates mainly as an 'insurance policy' to encourage innovation when patent protection is limited.
US data exclusivity periods are now longer for biologics than for new chemical entities (nCEs). Under the Hatch-Waxman legislation, the data exclusivity period is 5 years for nCEs. Patent challenges can be filed after 4 years, but face an additional stay on generic entry of up to 30 months. So, even allowing for a 30-month stay, small molecules with early patent challenges have shorter data exclusivity periods compared to biological entities (that is, 6.5 years versus 12 years). These differences, together with uncertainty on the outcomes of patent challenges early in the life cycle of a product, raise the question of whether future incentives for innovation will be tilted in the direction of biologics. This remains an important issue for further research. It is also notable that the European Union sought to avoid this outcome by harmonizing data exclusivity for both biological entities and chemical entities at 10 years plus an additional year for establishing a clinically important new indication.
